Supreme Court questions denial of bail under UAPA
Court cites KA Najeeb precedent supporting bail under UAPA
On Monday, May 18, the Supreme Court voiced sharp disapproval of a January 2026 judgment that had denied bail to activists Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots larger-conspiracy case, saying the two-judge bench that decided that matter failed to follow binding precedent set by a three-judge bench on bail in UAPA cases. The rebuke came in the context of a different case, where a two-judge bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan granted bail to Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, a Jammu and Kashmir resident who has been in NIA custody for over six years on allegations of funding terrorism through narcotics proceeds.
Justice Bhuyan’s judgment drew attention to Union of India v. KA Najeeb (2021), a three-judge bench decision that recognised prolonged pre-trial incarceration as a ground for bail even under the stringent Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). The Supreme Court said subsequent benches of lesser strength are bound to follow such a precedent and, if in doubt, must refer the issue to a larger bench rather than diverge from it.
A smaller bench cannot dilute, circumvent or disregard the ratio of a larger bench.” The statement underscored the court’s view that legal certainty and fairness demand fidelity to higher-court rulings.
The bench took particular aim at two rulings—Gurwinder Singh (2024) and Gulfisha Fatima (January 2026)—both authored by Justice Aravind Kumar. The Gurwinder Singh judgment had set out a “two-prong test,” effectively making bail contingent on the accused first demonstrating that the case against them lacked prima facie merit. The Supreme Court on Monday struck down that two-prong approach, saying it converted pre-trial detention into a de facto punitive ordeal lasting years, irrespective of how long an accused had already been imprisoned.
That practical reality animated much of the court’s reasoning. For people caught up in long-drawn prosecutions, the difference between being held in custody for months versus years can be the difference between keeping a job, preserving family life, and maintaining mental and physical health. The court emphasised that the protective reach of KA Najeeb cannot be whittled down by lower benches, and must remain available to guard against the corrosive effects of prolonged detention without trial.
The immediate effect of Monday’s order was to grant bail to Andrabi, who had already spent more than six years in custody. But its ripples run wider. like the UAPA—cannot be treated as a procedural inevitability. Where months or years in custody have elapsed, judges must weigh that reality in bail decisions rather than treat UAPA charges as an automatic bar to release.
For activists, lawyers and civil-society groups who have long criticised the use of stringent laws to prolong detention, the judgment will feel like vindication. It reiterates a basic human-rights concern: preventive detention cannot be allowed to substitute for a timely trial. For victims of terrorism and serious offences, the court recognised the equal need for justice; KA Najeeb does not trivialise the state’s investigative requirements but balances them against the fundamental liberties of the accused.
Lower benches are sometimes tempted to craft tests that seem to respond to ground realities, but the court reminded judges that doctrinal innovation must come through proper constitutional channels—larger benches—or else risk sowing confusion.
Justice Bhuyan’s firm language about stare decisis—the doctrine that courts should follow precedents—aims to restore predictability to bail jurisprudence under UAPA. It is a reminder that the rule of law depends not only on stern rhetoric, but on consistent application of principle across benches and cases.
For those who have been detained for years without conviction, Monday’s ruling offers a measure of hope: the law recognises that liberty cannot be indefinitely postponed in the name of investigation. For the legal community, it is a prompt to re-examine earlier decisions that deviated from KA Najeeb. And for the public, it is a reaffirmation that the highest court sees prolonged pre-trial detention not merely as a procedural by-product, but as a human cost that courts must actively guard against.
The Supreme Court’s rebuke may yet prompt further clarification: whether any other judgments that veered from KA Najeeb should be reconsidered, and whether larger benches should directly address the doctrinal boundaries of bail in UAPA cases. For now, the message is clear: precedent matters, and when liberty is at stake, judicial discipline is not a technicality—it is a human safeguard.